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Face Morphs  A New Pathway 
to Identity Fraud 
The human face recognition system is able to 
recognize new and highly varied instances of 
people we are familiar with. Unfamiliar face 
recognition, however, has been shown to be 
DGLI¿FXOWWDVNDQGRQHWKDWLVKLJKO\SURQHWR
error. [1] 
Despite this, agencies rely on unfamiliar face 
recognition in areas that are critical to our 
security. [2] For example, border control can 
UHO\ RQ RXU RI¿FLDOV¶ DELOLW\ WR GHFLGH ZKHWK-
HUDQXQIDPLOLDUWUDYHOHU¶VIDFHPDWFKHVWKHLU
passport photo. Getting this decision wrong 
allows individuals with fraudulent passports to 
illegally enter the country. In short, the poor 
recognition of unfamiliar faces is a concern 
for the United States as it can lead to errors in 
SHUVRQLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGLGHQWLW\IUDXG
In Volume 3, Issue 1 of the HDIAC Journal, 
UHVHDUFKHUVIURPWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI<RUN)DFH-
Var Lab reviewed research that showed the 
GLI¿FXOWLHV LQYROYHG LQ XQIDPLOLDU IDFH UHFRJ-
nition. [1] Now, in a recently published paper, 
WKLV UHVHDUFK WHDPKDV LGHQWL¿HGDQGTXDQWL-
¿HGDQHZSDWKZD\WRLGHQWLW\IUDXGZLWKLQWKH
context of unfamiliar face recognition, which 
involves the use of digitally manipulated face 
morphs on fraudulent identity cards. [3] 
)DFHPRUSKLQJLQYROYHVWDNLQJWZRUHJXODUIDFH
SKRWRV DQG GLJLWDOO\ EOHQGLQJ WKHP WR PDNH D
new face, which is similar to both the fraudster 
and the victim. In this way, the fraudster may 
LQFUHDVH WKHLU OLNHOLKRRG RI REWDLQLQJ D QHZ
genuine passport by fraudulent means, and in 
DGGLWLRQLQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIWKHLULGHQWLW\
fraud going undetected at border control points. 
The availability of image manipulation soft-
ware and apps has led to more examples of 
photo IDs that have been created by morph-
ing two faces together. This study is important 
in highlighting the potential security problem 
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Image 1: An example of an experimental trial used in the study. The passport photo contains a 
50/50 morph in this example. (Image courtesy of David Robertson/Released)
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Image 2: The morphing processing from one identity to the other. (Image courtesy of David Robertson/Released)
ZLWKWKLVDQGTXDQWLI\LQJWKHULVNRI WKLVW\SH
of fraud being missed.
The research has shown that both humans 
and smartphone face recognition algorithms 
(which mirror the type of system used in airport 
HJDWHVIUHTXHQWO\IDLOHGWRUHMHFWIDFHPRUSKV
as acceptable passport images of the two fac-
es contributing to the morph. 
Across three experiments, human viewers 
accepted a 50/50 morph as matching the 
WUDYHOOHU¶V IDFHSHUFHQWRI WKH WLPH:KHQ
participants were briefed about morph fraud 
DQG WKHQ DVNHG WR DFWLYHO\ GHWHFW WKHVH LP-
ages, 50/50 morph acceptance rates fell to 
21 percent. Despite this improvement in per-
IRUPDQFH WKLV DFFHSWDQFH UDWH LV VWLOO VLJQL¿-
cantly higher than that of a regular photo of an 
HQWLUHO\ GLIIHUHQW VLPLODU ORRNLQJ SHUVRQ 7KH
smartphone algorithm achieved similar results 
to briefed human viewers with a 50/50 morph 
acceptance rate of 27 percent. [3] 
Although the participants in this study are 
XQOLNHO\ WREHDVPRWLYDWHGRUDVVNLOOHGDVD
professional at spotting fraudulent photos, this 
study indicates that humans and smartphones 
PD\QRWQDWXUDOO\LGHQWLI\IDFHPRUSKVDZHDN-
ness that could be exploited by fraudsters. 
The head of this research group, Professor 
0LNH %XUWRQ VDLG ³,W LV HQFRXUDJLQJ KRZHY-
HUWKDWDUPHGZLWKWKHNQRZOHGJHRIPRUSKHG
SKRWR,'VWKHULVNRIIUDXGXOHQWDFWLYLW\EHLQJ
PLVVHGLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHGXFHG
Raising awareness of this type of fraud and 
including it in training schemes for front-line 
staff can help overcome these issues, and 
with new technologies coming online, it should 
EHDFKDOOHQJHWKDWFDQEHWDFNOHGZLWKVRPH
VXFFHVV´Ŷ
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Image 3: Shows an example of the procedure used with the smartphone face recognition algo-
rithm. The algorithm is encoded with a 50/50 morph (Stage 1) the fraudster then presents their 
real face to the system (Stage 2), and if the system decides if it thinks the images show the same 
person or not (Stage 3). This is analogous to the type of procedure used by airport e-gates. (Image 
courtesy of David Robertson/Released)
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